THESIS · VERSION 1.1 · 17 SEPTEMBER 2026 · RETURNS UPDATED 29 SEPTEMBER 2026

The Standard Deviation: a thesis

Abstract

Standard Reserve is an onchain monetary system that pays the banks running on it in its own currency, $STANDARD. Its rules set four games: a fixed daily issue shared by every branch, licence auctions for the right to open one, a payout that can only be taken by closing branches, and an exit fee that punishes crowds and pays those who stay. Played alone, the standard strategy is weak. This paper argues that pooling is the profitable deviation from it, sets out the policies by which The Standard Deviation acquires, retires and repays, and shows what the pool is modelled to earn in $STANDARD and what that becomes in ETH at any $STANDARD price.

Contents

  1. 01Standard Reserve in brief
  2. 02The banker’s game
  3. 03The deviation
  4. 04How the pool operates
  5. 05Returns
  6. 06The long view on $STANDARD
  7. 07Where we fit
  8. 08Risks and limits
  9. 09Sources and version

01Standard Reserve in brief

Standard Reserve describes itself as a closed monetary economy: one currency, $STANDARD; one market, where ETH trades against it; one signal, the net flow of ETH through that market; and one authority, a central bank written as immutable code. No company can vote on it, pause it or upgrade it.

The people who run it are bankers. A banker holds a charter, and a charter operates between one and ten branches. One thousand founding charters were sold at launch. They cannot yet be transferred, and the auction for new ones has not started.

Three rules matter to anyone who owns a bank.

1.1Issuance is one pie, split by branch

Every day the central bank issues 700,000 $STANDARD multiplied by a policy rate m, and divides it equally among all N branches in existence, second by second. One branch earns, per day:

y=700,000 × mN
(1)

1.2Money exists only when a branch is closed

Earnings accrue as a balance inside the bank, not as tokens in a wallet. $STANDARD is minted at one moment only: when a banker retires branches, which the Reserve’s own app calls dissolving them. Retiring k of a charter’s n branches releases

R=B×kn×(1 − φ)
(2)

where B is the charter’s balance and φ the exit fee of section 2.4. The retired branches are destroyed. Retiring the last one destroys the charter.

1.3Everything else burns or taxes

A new branch needs a licence, bought at the Reserve’s licence auctions in $STANDARD that is burned. Trades are taxed 2% on the way in and 3% on the way out. Exits pay the fee in (2), and thirty days of inactivity costs a bank 70% of its balance. Half of each of those penalties is burned and half is paid to the banks that remain.

THE MARKET

ETH ⇄ $STANDARD

One pool. 2% tax in, 3% out. It measures the net flow of ETH.
THE CENTRAL BANK

700,000 × m a day

Immutable code. It sets m from the net flow, between 0.2 and 1.25.
THE BANKS

1,000 charters, N branches

Each branch is credited an equal share, second by second, as a balance inside its bank.
OUT BY LICENCE

A new branch

Bought in $STANDARD at the Reserve’s licence auctions, 100 a day. All of it is burned.
OUT BY RETIREMENT

Minted $STANDARD

Close k of n branches for k/n of the balance, less the exit fee. Half the fee is burned, half goes to the banks that stay.
OUT BY SILENCE

70% forfeited

After thirty days without acting, anyone may close the bank. Half is burned, half goes to the banks that stay.
FIG. 1

How $STANDARD reaches a bank, and the only three ways it leaves one.

At block 65,629,152 the Reserve had 1,000 charters, 1,299 branches and 95,131,712 $STANDARD in circulation.

02The banker’s game

Those rules set four games. Each has a formula, and each formula has a best response.

2.1One pie

By (1), every new branch anywhere makes every existing branch earn less. With 1,299 branches a branch earns about 539 $STANDARD a day. At 5,500 it earns 127, and at the 10,000 that the founding charters can hold, 70.

Entry is rationed three ways: a fixed number of seats, ten slots to a seat, and 100 licences a day for the whole system, three per charter. The pie cannot be cut faster than 100 slices a day, so a branch opened early collects the large early slices.

What one branch earns a day as the Reserve adds branches A falling curve: about 539 $STANDARD a day per branch at today’s 1,299 branches, 127 at 5,500 branches and 70 at the 10,000 the founding charters can hold.
FIG. 2

One branch’s share of the daily issue, from formula (1) at m = 1. The Reserve can add at most 100 branches a day, so the curve is walked no faster than that.

2.2The licence

Licences sell by Dutch auction. The price opens at twice the previous day’s close and decays towards a floor of two days of one branch’s issuance:

Pfloor=2yP(t)=Popen×(PfloorPopen)t / 24h
(3)

Every auction so far has sold out within hours, far above the floor. The useful measure of the price is the number of days a branch takes to earn its own licence:

τ=Py
(4)

The first three auctions cleared at about 19, 33 and 24 days. At 24 days a branch returns its cost about fifteen times a year before dilution and costs, which is why they sell out.

2.3The payout problem

By (2), earnings can be taken only by destroying the branches that earn them, and a destroyed branch must be bought again at the day’s price. Measure a charter’s balance in days of its current earnings, t = B / (n × y). The cost of re-opening, as a share of what a retirement releases, is then

c=τt × (1 − φ)
(5)

The number of branches retired cancels out. The cost of a payout depends only on how long the balance has been building. Paying out early is expensive: while t is below τ, a payout costs more than it releases.

A charter with a single branch cannot take anything without destroying itself. After three auctions, 861 of the 1,000 founding charters had never bought a second.

The cost of a payout against how long the balance has built A falling curve. Re-opening a retired branch costs more than the retirement releases until the balance has built for about 24 days of earnings, and 25% of it after about 97 days.
FIG. 3

Formula (5) at the latest auction’s τ of 23.8 days and a 2% exit fee. The number of branches retired does not appear: only patience makes a payout cheap.

2.4The exit

A banker leaves by retiring branches, and the Reserve charges for it. The charge depends on how many others are leaving at the same time. Exit pressure is the share of all bank balances withdrawn over the trailing seven days:

P=Wmax(D + W, 10,000,000)
(6)

where W is the $STANDARD withdrawn in the last seven days and D is the $STANDARD still held in bank balances.

The fee rises with the square of that pressure, from 2% in calm to 60% in a run:

φ=0.02+0.58×min(P0.10, 1)2
(7)

Half of every fee is burned. The other half is paid to the banks that stayed.

The exit fee against exit pressure A curve rising from a 2% fee when nothing is being withdrawn, through 7% at 3% pressure and 16% at 5% pressure, to 60% at 10% pressure, where it stays. A hatched band on the left marks pressure below 2.3%, where the fee is at most 5% and the pool retires branches.
FIG. 4

The exit fee against the share of all bank balances withdrawn in the last seven days, drawn from formula (7). The hatched band is where the fee is at most 5%, the only place the pool retires branches.

In an ordinary bank run, leaving first is the winning move, so everyone runs. Here the order is reversed.

While others stayWhile others run
You leaveYou keep 98% of your balance and give up the branch’s future issue.You keep as little as 40% and give up the same future issue.
You stayYou keep earning your share of the issue.Your share of the issue grows as branches close, and you collect half of every fee the leavers pay.

The more bankers leave, the more leaving costs and the more staying pays. For a banker with no need to leave, staying is the dominant strategy. The only losing position is being forced to exit in a crowd.

2.5The central bank’s bias

The policy rate m starts at 1 and lives between 0.2 and 1.25. It is reset every epoch, currently three days, from the net flow of ETH over the last two:

Net flow over the last two epochsThe rate becomes
Negativemax(0.2, m − 0.15), at once
Positive, two epochs runningmin(1.25, m + 0.10)
Anything elsem, unchanged

Cuts are immediate and raises must be earned. Capital flowing in lifts what every branch earns by up to a quarter. Capital flowing out cuts it quickly, by up to four fifths, which protects the currency at the bankers’ expense.

03The deviation

In game theory a deviation is a player’s move away from the strategy everyone else is playing, and a position is stable only when no deviation pays. The standard strategy in the Reserve is the solo banker: one charter, one branch, run by hand. Section 02 shows where it is weak.

A branch is productive capacity of an unusual kind: scarce, destructive to realise, demanding to operate, and worth more the longer it is held. Standard Reserve rewards scale, patience and liveness, and a banker alone is short of all three.

AlonePooled
AccessOne of 1,000 seats, none for sale.A share of a seat, for anyone admitted.
CapacityOne branch. A second takes about 24 days of earnings.Ten branches filled within days, at the early yields of (1).
Taking profitImpossible with one branch without destroying the charter.A tenth at a time, only when (5) says it is cheap.
Exit feePaid whenever the owner needs the money.Retirements only in calm, never in a run.
SilenceOne missed month costs 70%.Never silent, and on the receiving side of that penalty.
LeavingClosing every branch burns the seat.Members leave through the pool. The seat survives.

Each row is a best response to one formula. Access and capacity answer (1): the early slices are the large ones, and only capital that arrives together can fill ten slots at once. Patience answers (5): a payout is cheap only for a bank that can wait. Calm answers (7): the fee is a transfer from those who must leave to those who need not. A pool is built to be the bank that need not.

The last row matters most. A solo banker who wants out must close every branch, pay the fee of the day and burn the seat. A member of the pool leaves by redeeming units in a weekly round. Every request in a round is met at one price and in the same proportion, from $STANDARD the pool has already realised, so inside the pool there is nothing to gain by running first. The Reserve itself still lets the first banker out at the lowest fee. The pool’s own rounds give no one that advantage. The bank itself never exits.

Pooling is therefore not a wrapper around the standard strategy. It turns scarce banking capacity into a strategy that scales and is operated every day, and under the Reserve’s own rules it is the better one.

04How the pool operates

The pool begins with founder-owned charter #729 and funds its other branches. It grows as new ETH comes in: the charter’s open branches first, then more charters as the Reserve makes them available. Its policies follow from section 02. They are published, and they change only with seven days’ public notice.

4.1Acquisition

Licences. Up to three a day on each charter until it holds ten branches, late in each sale, and only at or below 40 days of one branch’s current issuance, τ ≤ 40. The ceiling sits well above where sales clear on purpose: it stops a purchase near a sale’s opening price, never a late one.

Charters. None can be bought today. When the Reserve sells or frees them, the pool buys only with new ETH, and publishes first what it will buy, the most it will pay, and the modelled payback. Every charter acquired is then filled to ten branches.

Entry. Everyone joins the same pool, whenever they join. The principle is that a newcomer pays what capacity costs on the day they enter: a member’s ETH stays theirs, and refundable, until a purchase spends it, the earliest first, and the purchase converts it to units at the pool’s value at that moment, never at the price on the day it was deposited, against the pool’s $STANDARD, its releasable balances, and its branches and charters marked from recent auction prices, which is what the newcomer’s own ETH is about to pay for them. A branch is not liquid inventory. Its licence is burned, it cannot be sold, and its balance is released only by closing it, so what a member leaving is paid is a different and lower figure than what a member entering pays. The valuation policy that sets both, including how recent auction prices are averaged and how a charter bought in ETH is carried, is published with the terms.

The pool never sells $STANDARD to buy a charter, and never takes ETH to fund withdrawals.

4.2Dissolution

Retiring branches is the only way to be paid, so the pool does it by rule, charter by charter.

  1. Each charter pays for itself first. Nothing is retired on a charter until a single retirement, of every branch but the ones that must stay, would return what the pool paid for that charter and its licences, swap costs included. That retirement is made on the first day it can be. On charter #729 it is all but one of the pool’s branches.
  2. Then regular payouts. One branch is retired whenever re-opening it costs at most 25% of what the retirement releases, c ≤ 0.25 by (5), and it is re-opened under 4.1.
  3. Only in calm. No retirement while the exit fee is above 5%.
  4. Members waiting to leave. If a withdrawal request has waited 90 days, the pool retires the fewest branches that pay it, provided the exit fee is at most 10%.
  5. Never. The pool never retires the founder’s branch or a charter’s last branch, and retires nothing above a 10% exit fee.
Policy v117 September 2026
Licence price ceiling40 days of one branch’s issuance
Licences a day3 per charter, to ten branches
A charter’s first retirementwhen it returns the charter’s cost
Regular retirement1 branch, when c ≤ 25%
Exit fee ceiling5% (10% for rule 4)
Waiting-member trigger90 days
Notice of any change7 days

4.3Repayments

Everything a retirement brings in, from any charter, is paid to every member in proportion to their units, in $STANDARD, whenever they joined. A payout does not redeem units: ownership stays. What a charter returns up to its own cost carries no fee. The pool charges one fee, 10% of realised profit: what retirements bring in above the cost of the branches retired, after costs and earlier losses are recovered. It charges nothing to enter and nothing to leave.

Leaving is separate. A member queues units and is paid in weekly withdrawal rounds at that week’s unit value, from realised $STANDARD, with a price floor the member sets. Unpaid units stay invested and keep receiving payouts. There is no promised date and no guaranteed amount.

One charter’s modelled year A step chart of what one charter pays out, as a multiple of what its branches cost. Nothing is paid until day 79, when one retirement returns the whole cost. After a pause, regular payouts begin on day 186 and reach 2.5 times the cost by the end of the year.
FIG. 5

The pool’s model of its branches on charter #729 under policy v1, in the reference case, after the Reserve’s exit fee and the pool’s 10% fee. A model at one block, not a forecast; every figure is in $STANDARD.

4.4Growth

The Reserve is not selling charters yet, so the pool’s first year is one charter’s year: nothing for about eleven weeks, one large payout, a pause while the balance rebuilds, then a payout every fortnight.

Growth changes that pattern. Charters are bought as they come up for sale, on terms the pool publishes first, and every charter bought runs the same cycle from a different day. Their payouts overlap. A bank of charters at different stages pays its members something most weeks, which is how the pool’s two aims, capital back first and frequent payouts, are met together.

A ladder of charters Four rows, one for each charter, bought ninety days apart. Each row shows the same cycle: a tall tick when the charter pays for itself, then short ticks for regular payouts. A fifth row gathers every tick: payouts are rare at first and arrive every few days once four charters are running.
FIG. 6

An illustration of the policy, not a forecast. Each circle is a charter bought with new ETH, and every charter is drawn with the first charter’s modelled timing, bought ninety days apart. A later charter’s own timing will depend on prices when it is bought. In the last ninety days shown, 26 payouts reach every member.

4.5The founder

Charter #729 was bought by the founder in the founding sale and is held in the founder’s wallet, which is also the pool’s custodian. The pool’s contracts were reviewed by the operator and by reviewers the operator engaged, not by an independent security firm. The arrangement between the founder and the pool is set out here in full, as a related-party statement.

ItemTerms
Founder entitlementThe balance an untouched one-branch founding charter would hold, measured from the mint. Every branch earns the same, so any untouched charter shows it.
Pool entitlementEverything the charter holds above that benchmark: the branches the pool funds, and what they earn.
Fee10% of realised profit: what retirements bring in above the cost of the branches retired, after recorded costs and earlier losses. It vests for 30 days and is clawed back by later losses while unclaimed.
Operating costsTransaction costs are borne by the operator, not charged to members.
Purchase of #729Deferred: no payment and no liability in version 1. The price will reference the median of arm’s-length sales of founding charters over a stated window, once the Reserve makes them transferable, normalised to a one-branch charter and excluding the branches and balances the pool funded. If too few sales occur, the terms are revisited rather than estimated.
Where repayment ranksPaid only from a disclosed share of realised surplus, after funded claims and essential reserves; never from contributed principal or reserves. No date is promised.
After repaymentThe charter is committed to the pool and transferred into its custody when the Reserve allows transfers. Until then the founder’s wallet remains its holder and operator.

05Returns

There are two figures, and they answer different questions.

5.1Pool APY: what the pool earns, in $STANDARD

Pool APY is the modelled return, over twelve months and in $STANDARD, on ETH put into the pool now. New money buys a new bank: a charter at the Reserve’s charter auction, at no more than 5% over the last sale, which comes with the bank’s first branch, and then its licences, three a day, until the bank holds a charter’s ten branches.

The model follows the pool’s current strategy, which has replaced the first policy set out in section 04. Whenever a licence costs little enough of what a branch has built up, the pool retires a few branches and buys as many back in the same transaction, so the bank keeps every branch, and it pays what they released as weekly dividends. The model runs that day by day for a year against the Reserve’s issuance, counts the 3% cost of swapping ETH for $STANDARD as money put in, and takes the pool’s 10% fee on profit. When the year ends it counts members’ units at the pool’s own value per unit, the value new money pays to join and a member who leaves is paid: each charter and licence at what it cost, and the earnings in the bank after the Reserve’s exit fee. It counts nothing for what the bank earns after the year.

Two things the pool does not control decide the figure: what a licence costs, and how fast the Reserve adds branches. The Reserve now sells 80 licences a day and a new charter every twelve hours, so its ceiling on branches rises every day. The table runs the model across both, with the licence price in days of one branch’s yield.

Licences clear atThe auction stops: 5,533 branchesHalf the charters fill: 9,548Every charter fills: 17,360
20 days+300%back in 7 months+215%back in 7 months+135%back in 8 months
30 days, the latest+235%back in 9 months+165%back in 9 months+95%back in 11 months
40 days+195%back in 10 months+130%back in 11 months+70%back after the year

Each cell is Pool APY over twelve months after fees, then when the weekly dividends have paid back what was put in. Branches are the Reserve’s after a year, growing at today’s pace of 80 a day.

The reference case used in the rest of this paper is the latest licence price, 30 days, with the Reserve growing at its latest pace until half its charters are full, the charters its auction keeps adding included: +165%, the figure the pool’s app and Deviation show. It is a scenario, not an equilibrium. If every charter filled, the heaviest dilution the Reserve’s rules allow, it would be +95%.

The Reserve’s policy rate moves its issuance with the net flow of ETH through its market, and the model holds issuance where it is today. In the reference case:

Issuance, against todayPool APY
Half as much again+265%
A quarter more+215%
As today+165%
A quarter less+115%
Half+75%
A quarter+40%

Pool APY does not depend on the price of $STANDARD. Licences are paid in $STANDARD, branches earn $STANDARD, and the pace of new branches is capped by rule, not by price. What moves it is in the two tables above, and in the levers the Reserve’s owner holds, which section 08 sets out.

5.2Contribution APY: what your ETH becomes

Members contribute ETH and are paid in $STANDARD. What that is worth in ETH depends on where $STANDARD trades when it is sold:

Contribution APY=(1 + Pool APY)×x×0.96−1
(9)

where x is the $STANDARD price as a multiple of the price at entry, and 0.96 is what remains after the Reserve’s 3% sell tax and the 1% pool fee on the way back to ETH.

$STANDARD priceContribution APY1 ETH becomes
0.5×+25%1.3 ETH
1×, today+155%2.5 ETH
2×+410%5.1 ETH
3×+665%7.6 ETH
5×+1,170%12.7 ETH
10×+2,445%25.4 ETH

Break-even is x = 0.39. In this model a contributor gets their ETH back even if $STANDARD loses 61% of its value over the year. That cushion is thinner than it looks, because a falling price usually means capital leaving, and by section 2.5 capital leaving cuts what every branch earns.

5.3Against simply holding $STANDARD

A holder of $STANDARD earns nothing from the Reserve. A contributor with the same ETH ends the modelled year with

1 + Pool APY0.97≈2.7
(10)

times as many $STANDARD as the holder, whatever the price does, since both sell into the same market. Pool APY is the edge over holding the currency. The price decides what both are worth.

What 1 ETH becomes after twelve months, by $STANDARD price Two straight lines from the origin. Through the pool, 1 ETH becomes 2.5 ETH at today’s price and breaks even at 0.39 times today’s price. Held as $STANDARD, it becomes 0.93 ETH at today’s price.
FIG. 7

Formula (9) at a Pool APY of +165%, against buying and holding $STANDARD with the same ETH. The ruled line is 1 ETH: the pool crosses it at 0.39× today’s price, holding at 1.07×. The gap between the lines is formula (10); the price moves both.

None of these figures is a forecast or a promise. They are a model at one block, and a contributor can lose money.

06The long view on $STANDARD

The pool is paid in $STANDARD, measures itself in $STANDARD and never converts back to ETH. Its view of the currency rests on how supply behaves.

Supply can be minted only by closing branches, and the cap can only fall:

Scirc=100,000,000 + M − B − CSmax=1,000,000,000 − B − R
(11)

where M is minted on withdrawal, B burned, C deposited back into banks and R removed from bank balances, mostly by licences.

So far the burn is winning. By block 65,629,152 about 1.8 million $STANDARD had been issued to bank balances, while 4.44 million had come off the cap and circulating supply had fallen by 4.87 million, to 95,131,712. Almost all of it was bankers buying $STANDARD in the market and burning it for branches.

From licences alone, the Reserve burns more than it issues whenever

100×τ≥N
(12)

one hundred licences a day, each costing τ days of a branch’s 1/N share of the issue.

On 17 September that was 2,377 against 1,299. If τ stays where it is, issuance overtakes the licence burn once the Reserve passes about 2,400 branches. What pushes the other way is demand. There are only 100 licences a day however many bankers want them, so more charters means more bidders and a higher τ. Charter sales, when they start, add bidders, and the ETH they raise goes to the Reserve’s reserves, its permanent liquidity and its buybacks. Behind the licence burn sit the other sinks: half of every exit fee and every penalty for silence, the buybacks, and the tax on every trade.

When licence burns exceed issuance A plane of branch count against licence price in days of yield, split by the line where one hundred times tau equals N. The three auctions so far sit well inside the hatched region above the line, where licences burn more than the Reserve issues.
FIG. 8

Condition (12). Each point is one day’s auction: the branch count when it closed and the average price paid, in days of yield.

Issuance is also finite. The budget is 900 million $STANDARD. At m = 1 it lasts about three and a half years, after which banks are paid from recycled fees alone. The banks worth owning then are the ones that were built early and stayed.

That is the pool’s position. Every ETH contributed is a market purchase of $STANDARD that is burned into permanent capacity. The pool retires branches only in calm, so it adds nothing to a run and is paid by those who join one. It expects a currency with a falling cap, an asymmetric central bank and a growing reserve behind it to be worth more as the system grows. It does not need that to be true to out-earn holding the currency, by (10), and it states the downside in (9).

07Where we fit

A monetary system whose yield is reserved for a thousand seat-holders needs intermediaries, as every banking system has. The Standard Deviation is built to be four things.

An access layer. Capital that lacks a charter, enough scale, enough patience or the means to operate a bank every day has one alternative today, which is holding the currency. The pool gives it a strategy that is otherwise hard or impossible to run well.

Patient capital. The Reserve pays those who stay and taxes those who run. A pool with published rules, no need to exit and no silent months is the counterparty that design rewards, and a stabilising one: its purchases burn supply and its retirements happen only in calm.

A buyer of seats. When charters become transferable, selling a seat is an exit with no sell pressure on $STANDARD. The pool intends to be a standing bidder, by mandate, and to fill every seat it buys.

A protocol. $STANDEV is The Standard Deviation’s own proposed token. Its rights, its issuance and any link to the 10% fee are not yet defined. Pool units are not $STANDEV, and neither is a claim on the other.

08Risks and limits

  • Custody. The Reserve does not let a charter move, so the charter, the branches the pool pays for and the $STANDARD they earn are held under the founder’s key. Contributing means trusting the founder. Charters the pool buys later are held the same way until the Reserve allows transfers. The pool’s contracts have been reviewed by the operator and by reviewers the operator engaged; there has been no audit by an independent security firm.
  • The Reserve’s owner. The Reserve’s contracts cannot be upgraded, but its owner keeps bounded control of several economic settings: licences a day (80 today, up to 2,000), charters a day (two today, up to 100), trading taxes (up to 10%), the length of an epoch (one to seven days) and the split of fees. The pool treats those controls as an explicit strategy risk. Faster licence sales bring dilution forward, and charter sales lift the ceiling on branches: in the model, if every charter filled, about 17,000 branches after a year, the reference Pool APY would fall from +165% to about +95%.
  • Contraction. Net outflows cut the policy rate to as little as 0.2, which lowers Pool APY at the same time as the price falls.
  • Exit-fee spikes. Above 5% the pool does not retire branches, so payouts and withdrawals pause.
  • Liquidity. Units are not transferable. Withdrawals are paid from realised $STANDARD over time, with no promised date or amount.
  • The model. The Reserve has existed for days and the pool has not yet made a payout. Pool APY is a calculation at one block, not a track record, and it moves with every auction.
  • Price. Contributions are ETH and payouts are $STANDARD. Below x = 0.39 a contributor loses ETH even if the model holds.

09Sources and version

Standard Reserve whitepaper, version 1.0, at standardreserve.xyz/whitepaper. Chain figures were read from Robinhood Chain (4663) at block 65,629,152 on 17 September 2026. The returns of section 05 were recomputed at block 75,856,587 on 29 September 2026 with the pool’s payout model, the one its app and Deviation use. Current figures: the pool’s app .

The Standard Deviation is independent of Standard Reserve and is not affiliated with or endorsed by it. Public contributions are not yet open. Thesis version 1.1: section 05 and the figures that quote it were updated on 29 September 2026; section 04 describes the pool’s first policy, as published on 17 September.